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Abstract
By using data from thirteen publicly traded commercial and deposit banks this
paper estimates the determinants of market risk for bank equities in the case of an
emerging market setting, Turkey. The analysis reveals that maturity composition of
a bank's loans, the share of trading income in a banks' overall revenue stream and
foreign-ownership structure are important indicators of the volatility of its equity
returns. Banks with shorter loan maturity positions are regarded by investors as
safer companies to invest in while increases in trading income as a source of bank's
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1 Introduction
Banking and nancial sector performance is crucial to economic growth as evidenced by
literature(such as Levine (1997)) and other studies have shown that this causality runs
from nancial sector to growth(i.e. Rousseau and Wachtel (1998)). Therefore performance
of the nancial intermediaries is also important for economic growth. As the 2008 Global
Financial Crisis has shown banks' balance sheet problems may lead to a contraction
of credit to the real sector eventually triggering a recession with serious consequences.
Moving from this premise, in this paper I evaluate the drivers of equity returns for nancial
intermediaries in an emerging market setting such as Turkey. Turkey has demonstrated
a phenomenal average growth rate of 5.72% mostly fueled by extension of credit by the
banking system between 2002 and 2009.1 Understanding what inuences banks' share
prices in Turkey is also important in understanding the Turkish economic miracle.
Another aim of this paper is to check whether in an emerging market setting such
as Turkey foreign ownership leads to lower risk for the banking system. The previous
literature on this topic leads us to believe so: Micco, Panizza, and Yanez (2004) have
shown that in developing countries foreign banks usually have higher protability and
lower overhead costs compared to local ones. Figueira, Nellis, and Parker. (2006) nd
some support for the argument that domestically-owned banks perform less eciently
than foreign-owned banks in Africa. 2If this is the case in Turkey, we can also expect
to see lower equity volatility for banks held in foreign ownership compared to domestic
ones.3 Isik and Hassan (2003)have shown that private foreign banks perform better than
private domestic and government banks in Turkey. They indicate that \foreign ownership
as well as being traded on the stock exchanges had the most signicant eects on bank
performances [and that] higher market share of foreign banks in the local banking markets
was associated with higher performance of all sample banks in that market."
By utilizing data from the nancial statements and about the ownership structure of
thirteen publicly traded commercial and investment banks, this paper aims to evaluate
the determinants of risk in equity returns for Turkish banking system. In the next section
I review previous research on this issue; in Section 3 the dataset is presented; Section 4
provides the empirical estimation; Section 5 provides my ndings and Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
One of the earliest papers in literature that examines the relationship between volatil-
ity of equity returns and diversication of market value is by Templeton and Severiens
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(1992) who nd that increases in diversication result in diminishing marginal decreases
in risk and that diversication does not appear to have an important eect on measures
of systematic risk. Saunders and Walter (1994) simulate mergers between bank holding
companies and non-bank rms and show that there are risk-reduction benets of diversi-
cation. Demsetz and Strahan (1997) follow the work of Templeton and Severiens (1992)
and show that although large bank holding companies(BHCs) are better diversied than
small BHCs, there is not necessarily any signicant dierence in terms of their risk reduc-
tion. They attribute the higher risk potential of the larger BHCs to their lower capital
ratios and larger commercial and industrial loan portfolios. In one of the more recent pa-
pers on this issue, Stiroh (2006) uses equity data on BHCs to evaluate the eects of BHCs'
loan and revenue composition on their risk. His contribution to the literature is unique
in the sense that it emphasizes market-based assessment of risk and return rather than
accounting data assessment as most of previous literature has done. Market-based assess-
ment provides forward looking perspective in terms of expected returns while accounting
data is backward-looking.
All of the above mentioned literature studies the case of the US banking system.
The literature that looks at the same relationship between risk in equity returns and
diversication of bank activities is limited in an emerging market setting. Sanya and
Wolfe (2010) uses a panel dataset of 226 listed banks across 11 emerging economies to
show the eect of revenue diversication on bank performance and risk. Their ndings
highlight the positive impact of diversication in banks' activities on the insolvency risk
and protability. As the measure of risk in their research they use bank performance
measures such as return on assets(ROA) and return on equity (ROE) adjusted for risk as
opposed to a stock price measure. In terms of evaluating bank risk in Turkey however,
there is no prior study that I am aware of. In that regard, this paper aims to contribute to
the existing literature by providing an equity return aspect of risk in an emerging market
setting such as Turkey.
3 Data
I use data on the average monthly returns of thirteen publicly traded commercial and
investment banks in Turkey to measure the risk factor. This data comes from The Istanbul
Stock Exchange(ISE) and is only available on a monthly average return basis. My analysis
excludes the Turkish Banking Crisis (2001-2002) and starts with the last quarter of 2002.
For the thirteen banks in the sample, a full data sample in terms of equity returns is
only available for third quarter of 2007 onwards. Table 1 provides the summary statistics
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of equity returns for the variables in the sample. Figure 2 shows the median of monthly
average returns for the 13 publicly traded banks on a quarterly basis versus the medi-
ans of the standard deviation of these monthly average returns per bank on a quarterly
basis for the period under study. The gure and the data reported in the table suggest
a relatively non-volatile risk for the banking industry except for the 2008-2009 period
which corresponds to the Global Financial Crisis. We see average monthly returns falling
continuously between rst quarter of 2008 till the second quarter of 2009 at a rate of over
14%, 6% and around 9% in the rst, second and fourth quarter of this year respectively.
The standard deviation of the average monthly returns during this period jumps to a high
of 29.33%. Although this is not an all time high in the sample, the duration of the high
volatility is a record for the given period4.
Table 1: Return Summary Statistics
quarter Obs Std of Average Monthly returns Average monthly returns
2002q4 10 32.58 8.72
2003q1 10 18.72 -0.26
2003q2 10 15.02 5.31
2003q3 10 11.42 2.59
2003q4 10 17.88 18.47
2004q1 10 14.60 4.68
2004q2 10 10.36 -2.14
2004q3 10 9.83 8.63
2004q4 11 17.18 10.65
2005q1 11 19.02 11.17
2005q2 11 10.77 5.57
2005q3 11 12.47 9.54
2005q4 11 18.38 7.23
2006q1 12 17.76 2.50
2006q2 12 13.87 -4.95
2006q3 12 6.89 2.75
2006q4 12 13.46 1.37
2007q1 12 9.70 2.30
2007q2 12 8.36 1.64
2007q3 13 10.94 5.24
2007q4 13 7.36 0.40
2008q1 13 14.15 -14.60
2008q2 13 22.59 -6.36
2008q3 13 29.33 8.74
2008q4 13 16.46 -8.92
2009q1 13 14.54 -2.36
2009q2 13 19.36 21.84
2009q3 13 11.84 11.01
2009q4 13 15.83 4.96
2010q1 13 11.49 1.92
The table shows the median standard deviation of monthly returns and the me-
dian of average monthly returns per each quarter studied in the paper.Monthly
return data is obtained from Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE)
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Figure 1: Bank Risk and Returns.
Source: Istanbul Stock Exchange(ISE) and Turkish Banks Association(TBB). The gure shows the median of the average monthly
returns(return variable) in a quarter as well as the standard deviation of the average monthly returns in the same quarter(risk variable).
Balance Sheet and Income Statement data are obtained from the Banks Association
of Turkey (TBB). This dataset covers a period of 30 quarters (2002q4-2010q1) and is
unbalanced due to the unavailability of data for some of the banks in the sample. Some of
the balance sheet variables pertaining to maturity composition of bank loans can only be
obtained until the third quarter of 2006 limiting my ability for analysis in terms of banks'
term composition of loans. Table 2 provides the summary statistics of balance sheet and
income statement variables for the banks in the sample. The mean of total assets for the
banks in the sample is 28.5 bil TL which corresponds to around 20 bil USD (based on an
exchange rate of 1.5 TL per USD). In terms of size, the sample includes a good range of
small and big banks in Turkey with assets ranging from 134 bil TL to 428 mil TL as the
table shows. The wide range allows us to better reect the eects of diversication since
I are not only concentrating on big or small banks.
4 Empirical Estimation
I follow an empirical model on evaluating risk of Bank Holding Companies by Stiroh (2006)
using balance sheet and income statement variables. In the rst part of my estimation, I
evaluate the eect of banks' diversication on their loan portfolios in terms of maturity
5
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
03Q1 03Q3 04Q1 04Q3 05Q1 05Q3 06Q1 06Q3
Mean +/- 1 S.D.
Figure 2: Short Term Loan Ratio
Source: Turkish Banks Association(TBB). The gure shows the median and 1
std deviation bounds of the short term loan to total loan portfolio in the sample.
by using the following specication5:
riski;t =+ ln(tai;t 1) + 2ln(tai;t 1)2 + shloansi;t 1 + hhi(mat)i;t 1
+ banki;t 1 + foreignt + "i;t
(4.1)
where riski;t is the risk for bank i in quarter t measured by the standard deviation
of monthly returns on the Istanbul Stock Exchange during that month. tai;t 1 is total
assets for bank i in period t  1. I use one period lagged variables in the estimation since
investors make their portfolio decisions regarding each bank stock based on last period's
nancial information available. shloansi;t 1 represents the ratio of the bank's short term
loan portfolio to its overall loans, hhi(mat)i;t 1 is the calculated Herndahl Hirschmann
Index (HHI) value for the bank's loan composition in terms of maturity(the higher this
value, the more concentrated the bank's loan portfolio is in terms of maturity- see below for
6
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics For Bank Specic Variables
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Assets(ta) 28,528.75 18,981.19 134,018.20 428.40 29,597.33 1.34 4.14
Loans(loans) 13,333.29 8,026.68 57,978.95 155.23 14,336.26 1.33 3.78
FX Loans(fxloans) 4,946.19 2,874.67 26,793.77 45.50 5,632.23 1.69 5.54
Short Term Loans(stloans) 3,450.79 2,656.84 12,868.65 8.94 2,962.39 1.07 3.62
Nonint Income(nonii) 695.43 266.16 6,392.15 -1.28 1,030.27 2.65 10.89
Operating Inc(oprinc) 1,526.04 780.43 11,122.20 8.30 1,870.36 2.06 7.70
Trading Inc(trainc) 68.67 16.07 1,726.01 -378.33 203.37 3.17 19.68
Dividend Inc(divinc) 8.74 1.22 408.46 0.00 32.07 8.36 91.17
Net Fee Inc(feeinc) 259.04 125.31 1,725.07 0.69 329.06 1.99 6.89
Other Nonint Inc(othnonii) 361.08 94.86 5,054.30 -372.67 736.12 3.42 15.43
Deposits(deposits) 18,999.51 13,692.45 75,362.54 625.10 17,553.44 1.11 3.40
Equity(equity) 3,330.79 1,829.47 15,597.51 0.00 3,573.20 1.43 4.37
Nonperforming Loans(npl) 661.72 390.36 3,010.83 1.77 657.33 1.17 3.89
Obalance Sheet Rev(obal) 44,812.24 23,820.03 297,938.88 340.42 53,791.18 1.79 6.25
Operating Prot(prot) 389.48 164.53 3,099.60 -2,603.75 551.94 1.40 8.72
The table shows the descriptive statistics of variables for 13 publicly traded banks used in estima-
tions. Data is obtained from the Turkish Banks Association. The number of observations is 381.
All data is in terms of 1 million Turkish Liras(TL).
the calculation of this ratio) banki;t 1 is a vector of other bank specic variables obtained
from the balance sheets and income statements of the banks in the sample and foreignt
is a dummy variable based on bank's ownership structure6. I do not use a lagged value for
foreign dummy since ownership change in banks is a more readily available information
than bank specic variables and investors will make their decisions regarding buying or
selling a bank stock based on ownership information at time t as opposed to a quarter
ago.
In the panel estimation I use a joint cross-section and period eects model. While each
bank is dierent, each quarter also is dierent in the sense that there are changes within
each bank's loan portfolio and nancial statement variables7. Even though period xed
eect methodology is favored by some of the existing literature such as Stiroh (2006) for
the Turkish bank sample I nd that using only a period-eects model, the residual error
terms are serially correlated.
The bank specic vector of banki;t 1 includes the following variables in from the bank's
balance sheet and income statement in period t  1:
 liability composition, measured by the ratio of deposits to total assets.
 loan quality measured by the ratio of bank's non-performing loans to overall loan
portfolio
 o balance sheet activities measured by the ratio of bank's obalance sheet income
to its overall operating prot.
 bank's liquidity measured by loan to total assets ratio
To capture the impact of banks' diversication in loan maturity I compute the Hernd-
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ahl Hirschmann Index (HHI) as follows:
HHI(mat) = (
stloans
loans
)2 + (
ltloans
loans
)2 (4.2)
where,
loans = stloans+ ltloans (4.3)
stloans represents short-term loans, similarly ltloans stands for long term loans in the
bank's loan portfolio(loans). HHI(mat) ranges between 0.50 and 1. An increase in this
variable indicates an increase in the concentration of a particular type of loan in terms
of maturity. The median value for this ratio in the sample is .57 indicating that the loan
portfolios of the banks in the sample are fairly balanced. The availability of loan data
in terms of its maturity composition is limited to 2002-2006 as indicated in the Data
Section(Section 3).
In the second part of my estimation, I evaluate the eect of banks' revenue composition
on their overall risk. For this analysis, I break down the total revenue of banks in the
sample into two and ve categories respectively. In the two category breakdown I evaluate
banks' revenues in terms of:
1. Interest Income
2. Non-interest Income
and in the ve-category breakdown, I breakdown the noninterest income further into its
components as:
1. Interest Income
2. Net Fee Income
3. Trading Income
4. Dividend Income
5. Other Non-Interest Income
The estimation takes the following form for the two-component breakdown:
riski;t = +ln(tai;t 1)+2ln(tai;t 1)2+noniii;t 1+hhi(rev2)i;t 1+banki;t 1+foreignt+"i;t
(4.4)
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and the following form for the ve-component breakdown:
riski;t =+ ln(tai;t 1) + 2ln(tai;t 1)2 + feeinci;t 1 + trainci;t 1 + divinci;t 1
+ xiothnoniii;t 1 + hhi(rev5)i;t 1 + banki;t 1 + foreignt + "i;t
(4.5)
where noniii;t 1 is the non-interest income for bank i at time t   1 as a ratio of
operating revenue, feeinci;t 1 is the ratio of the bank's total net fee income to operating
revenue; trainc is the trading income as a ratio of operating revenue and similarly divinc,
othnonii are the bank's dividend and other non-interest income calculated as a ratio of its
operating revenue. hhi(rev2) is the calculated Herndahl Hirschmann Index (HHI) value
for the bank's revenue composition based on two-component categorization(interest and
non-interest income). The higher this value is, the more concentrated the bank's revenue
becomes in terms of its source(see below for the calculation of this ratio.) Similarly,
hhi(rev5) is the same ratio calculated as ve-component breakdown of the bank's revenue
sources.
The HHI ratios are calculated as follows:
HHI(rev2) = (
intinc
oprinc
)2 + (
nonii
oprinc
)2 (4.6)
where,
oprinc = intinc+ nonii (4.7)
for the two-component breakdown and
HHI(rev5) = (
intinc
oprinc
)2 + (
feeinc
oprinc
)2 + (
trainc
oprinc
)2 + (
divinc
oprinc
)2 + (
othnonii
oprinc
)2 (4.8)
where,
oprinc = intinc+ feeinc+ trainc+ divinc+ othnonii (4.9)
for the ve component breakdown.
oprinc represents bank's operating income, intinc is the bank's interest income and
nonii is the bank's non-interest income.
9
5 Findings
Table 3 shows the results of my estimations for both maturity and revenue composition
breakdowns. The estimation results suggest the following relationships for the Turkish
banking system:
 An increase in the banks' short term loan composition as a function of its overall
loan portfolio is inversely related with risk. A one-percentage point increase in this
ratio leads to an increase in the standard deviation of monthly returns in a quarter
by 28-30%. Although the signicance of this relationship is not very strong, this
coecient is very high.
 Foreign ownership dummy seems to have a signicant and robust eect in all of the
estimations suggesting that investors foresee foreign owned banks as relatively safer
than locally owned banks in Turkey. Alternatively, this suggests that locally owned
banks have higher risk associated with them as opposed to foreign owned ones.This
nding is in line with existing literature.
 An increase in the banks' deposits to total asset ratio is considered comforting
by investors; we observe this variable to take on the negative sign in all of my
estimations8.
 As highly expected, an increase in the ratio of non-performing loans in the banks'
overall loan portfolio increases the risk factor; this relationship is robust in all my
estimations.
 Of all the revenue components evaluated, the only one that is signicance in the
estimations is the trading income. A highly signicant source of risk for banks in
Turkey, the higher the ratio of this variable in the bank's overall revenue composition,
the riskier is the bank.
The estimations however fail to nd any signicant relationship regarding the HHI con-
centration ratios I have utilized in the study. This nding suggests concentration in terms
of maturity of loans or revenue breakdown is not necessarily considered by investors a
signicant risk factor in the equity pricing of Turkish banks.
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6 Conclusions
By using data from thirteen publicly traded commercial and deposit banks in Turkey,in
this paper I have estimated the determinants of bank equity market risk in the case of an
emerging market setting, Turkey. The analysis reveals three important conclusions regard-
ing bank risk in Turkey from an equity return perspective: Firstly, maturity composition
of a bank's loans is an important indicator of the volatility of its equity returns. The
rationale here is banks with shorter loan maturity positions carry less maturity mismatch
risk and are regarded by investors as safer companies to invest in. A second conclusion we
can arrive from the analysis presented is that source of revenue for a bank also serves as a
good predictor of bank's equity volatility. In that regard, we see that increases in trading
income as a source of bank's overall revenue increases the volatility of its equity returns.
This nding suggests for equity investors a bank's income statement is as important as its
balance sheet and the volatile nature of a bank's trading revenue is regarded as a source
of risk for bank's protability. This nding has important implications for bank managers
and regulators; bank managers who rely on trading revenue as a signicant contributor of
their bank's overall revenue inadvertently cause their bank stock to become more volatile;
from regulators' perspective it suggests banks' trading activity is a source of risk to bank's
overall health and thus needs to be more closely watched. And a nal attribution of this
paper to the literature on banking in Turkey is the importance it stresses on the foreign
versus domestic ownership of the bank. The results of this study show there is a robust
and signicant link between a bank's ownership status and its equity return volatility.
During the course of our study, it is observed that investors consider foreign owned banks
as less risky equity investments. This nding is not unique; for Turkey and many emerging
market banking systems similar results have been observed.9 In that regard, this paper
contributes to the literature by providing more evidence to the nding. The reasons be-
hind investors' perception of foreign owned banks as less risky investments as opposed to
domestic ones however is a topic to be investigated in further research.
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Notes
1For a survey of developments in the Turkish economy and the 2001-2002 banking crisis see Payaslioglu
(2009).
2Although the authors add that they cannot safely conclude that the larger the percentage of assets
owned domestically, the worse the relative performance will be.
3There are also more recent studies that argue this relationship may not hold. For instance, by using
stochastic frontier analysis for a sample of 2095 commercial banks in 105 countries Lensink, Meesters,
and Naaborg (2008) show that foreign ownership negatively aects bank eciency.
4The highest volatility in my sample is recorded for the rst observation(the fourth quarter of 2002)
where the standard deviation of the average monthly volatility reaches 32.58%. The high volatility in this
period could be considered a residual of the Turkish Banking Crisis of 2000-2001 during which Savings
Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) closed down eleven banks and the Turkish Lira was devalued by 40%
against the USD.(Tanyeri 2010)
5Stiroh (2006) uses revenue composition as a measure of his analysis,yet in the case of Turkey prelim-
inary estimations regarding revenue composition does not necessarily yield any signicant results. The
same could be said for the currency composition of the banks' loan portfolio. Preliminary results re-
garding this variable also suggested no statistical signicance and redundant variable testing proved this
measure not to be a signicant explanatory variable in the case of Turkish banks
6I dene a bank "foreign" if the share of the foreign owner exceeds 50.01% following IFRS standards. A
redundancy test shows that foreignt is an important variable in the estimations that cannot be considered
redundant.
7Results of redundant xed eects tests for the equation reveal the joint signicance of all of the
eects, respectively. The cross-section/period f test has a t-stat value of 4.58 with 25 and 116 degrees of
freedom and a chi-square value of 104.48 with 25 degrees of freedom. Both these tests have 0% probability
which reject the restricted model in which there is only a single intercept. In addition, in estimations
of the above equation using only a period eects model, I nd that the residual error terms are serially
correlated and the Durbin-Watson Statistic is 1.37.
8Although in the maturity composition estimations, I do not observe any signicance
9Such as Isik and Hassan (2003), Figueira, Nellis, and Parker. (2006), Micco, Panizza, and Yanez
(2004)
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